The Last King of Scotland or the Last N----r on Earth? The Ethics of Race on Film by Taylor, Paul C.
Contemporary Aesthetics
Special Volume 2 (2009) AESTHETICS AND RACE:
NEW PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
2009
The Last King of Scotland or the Last N----r on
Earth? The Ethics of Race on Film
Paul C. Taylor
Temple University, ptaylor@temple.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/
liberalarts_contempaesthetics
Part of the Esthetics Commons
This V. Ethics and Politics is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberal Arts Division at DigitalCommons@RISD. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Contemporary Aesthetics by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@RISD. For more information, please contact mpompeli@risd.edu.
About CA
Journal
Contact CA
Links
Submissions
Search Journal
 
Editorial Board
Permission to Reprint
Privacy
Site Map
Publisher
Webmaster
The Last King of Scotland or the Last N----r on Earth?
The Ethics of Race on Film
  Paul C. Taylor 
Abstract
This paper undertakes four tasks. It examines a tradition of
cinematic and narrative representation that we might call “the
narrative of moral gentrification.” It insists on the importance
of excavating the racialist and often racist images, motifs, and
myths that constitute this tradition. It recommends a form of
philosophical aesthetics, located at the intersection of
aesthetics, ethical perfectionism, and critical race theory, as a
resource for doing this work. And it insists on the importance
of subjecting problematic or qualitatively inferior expressive
objects to critical scrutiny for the sake of developing proper
iconographies and archives of white supremacist expressive
culture.
Key Words
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1. Introduction: Mooney’s Blues
From time to time, the late, lamented “Dave Chappelle Show”
on the Comedy Central cable television network found ways to
feature comedian and comic writer Paul Mooney. Each of these
features, from “Ask a Black Dude” to “Negrodamus” and
“Mooney on Movies,” operated from the same slender
premise: provide Mooney with an opportunity to offer
unscripted comic observations. Set pieces like this can succeed
only if the featured performer has a fertile comic mind and
nimble tongue. But in the right hands they can go beyond
mere success to transcend the merely comedic and achieve
tragicomic depth.
The great writer and critic Ralph Ellison developed these ideas
of depth and transcendence in ways that have had lasting
significance for American and African-American letters.
Focusing on the expressive practice that many now take as the
Ur-text of Afro-U.S. culture, he once described the blues not
as a musical form, though he was a skilled and well-trained
musician, and not (just) as a lyric form, though he was a
writer of unsurpassed skill. “The blues,” he said, “is an impulse
to keep the painful details and episodes of a brutal experience
alive in one’s aching consciousness, to finger its jagged grain,
and to transcend it, not by the consolations of philosophy but
by squeezing from it a near-tragic, near-comic lyricism.”[1]
Mooney has approached Ellison’s transcendence many times
during his days as a writer for Richard Pryor and for shows like
“Good Times,” as well as in his own stand-up comedy. But he
never came closer to achieving it during his association with
Chappelle than during a segment entitled “Mooney on Movies.”
Here the comedian appears as a movie critic, seated, in the
fashion of Siskel and Ebert, in an otherwise empty theatre,
oddly sandwiched between two young white women. (Both
women are blonde, with one dressed like a news anchor and
the other dressed, as my wife put it, like an off-duty Playboy
bunny. These facts bear examination, but cannot receive it in
the space available to me here.) Each of the several films the
trio discusses receives the same treatment: the women
introduce the film and share their thoughts on it, while the
camera occasionally cuts away from their conversation to
catch Mooney in various states of irritation and annoyance.
Then, finally, Mooney offers his take, invariably to dismiss the
film on broadly racial grounds with his characteristic brand of
world-weary exasperation.
When the discussion turns to Tom Cruise’s nineteenth century
historical epic, “The Last Samurai,”[2]Mooney offers his
judgment:
Hollywood is crazy. “The Last Samurai,” starring
Tom Cruise. He’s the last samurai? Give me a
break. That movie was offensive…. First they had
“The Mexican” with Brad Pitt, now they have “The
Last Samurai” with Tom Cruise. Well I’ve written
a film. Maybe Hollywood will produce it. “The Last
Nigger on Earth,” starring Tom Hanks.[3]
With this diatribe, Mooney offers two lessons that I mean to
take seriously and develop in this paper. First, he points to an
important and still-vital tradition of cinematic and narrative
representation. Call it, for reasons I’ll come to, the narrative of
moral gentrification. This tradition borrows from, refines, and
reveals patterns of meaning that continue to shape social life
wherever the modern concept of race has had an impact.[4]
Because of the lingering impact of this tradition, it is important
to excavate the images, motifs, and myths that constitute it to
promote greater understanding of the world we inhabit. That
excavation can and should be part of the work of philosophical
aesthetics.
Mooney also shows that the blues impulse can be extended to
the work of criticism. The burden of criticism is in part to
explain what the art object is, to offer an account of just what
the auditor will see, hear, or experience, by reading the object
against some relevant, perhaps generic, norms for production
and evaluation. So just as Stuart Klawans tells us that
“Knocked Up” is another update on Stanley Cavell’s comedy of
remarriage, Mooney tells us that “The Last Samurai” belongs
to and develops its own tradition.[5] But this is an insight, a
way of seeing that comes to Mooney by reading the film in the
light of Ellison’s “aching consciousness” of racial exclusion and
marginalization. What I might (but will mostly decline to) call
a blues criticism will finger the jagged grain of problematic
expressive objects for the sake of developing proper
iconographies and archives of white supremacist expressive
culture. Criticism like this should be a vital part of critical race
theory and can make interesting contributions to the literature
on the relations between ethics and art.
2. History and the Africanist Presence
The moral gentrification narrative is my name for a certain
kind of historical fiction film. History-based fiction films are
well known for taking liberties with their subjects, especially
when the films in question are Hollywood features. But we can
still take these films seriously as history by using historian
Robert Rosenstone’s distinction between “true inventions” of
historical subjects on film and “false inventions.” Both
inventions “engage…the issues, ideas, data, and arguments of
the ongoing discourse of history….” But true inventions are not
“capricious:” they do not “exist in a state of historical
innocence” or “ignore the findings and assertions and
arguments of what we already know from other sources.” For
Rosenstone, fiction films work as history when they “make
meaning out of people and events in the past” without doing
violence to what we already know.[6]
To make meaning in this way is not just to communicate facts,
although finding and insisting on widely accepted facts is
useful. It is also to recommend a way of looking at the world,
or to recommend the picture, in something like Wittgenstein’s
sense, that results from this way of looking. This way of
looking at history – this “historiophoty”[7] – will subordinate
some causal factors to others; it will find heroes where
another way of looking finds bystanders, opportunists, or just
more effects of deeper causes; and it will raise questions
where other perspectives posit axioms. Insofar as the
historian’s burden is to tell us “what to think about ‘the facts,’”
fiction films, and other pieces of narrative art, can assume at
least some of this ineliminably normative burden.[8]
The narrative of moral gentrification traffics in false inventions
because it interprets the facts of history by appeal to a
misleading “collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies”
about non-white people.[9] In gentrification narratives about
black people, which this essay will take as its principal subject,
the collection of images in question is the mythology to which
Toni Morrison has given the name “Africanism.” She defines
Africanism, less helpfully than she might have, as “the
denotative and connotative blackness that African peoples
have come to signify, as well as the entire range of views,
assumptions, readings, and misreadings that accompany
Eurocentric learning about these people.”[10] Morrison’s idea
is that black people in Western culture become occasions for
working out white problems, and that in the U.S. this process
is intimately bound up with the creation of the identities and
literatures on which the relevant authorities are willing to
confer the title “American.” Western literature, she says, has
always relied on an “Africanist presence,” using invented
Africans to clarify the stakes, parameters, and challenges of
modernity, whiteness, and national identity. And it has usually
done this while ignoring both the centrality of black peoples to
modern history and the complexity of black personalities and
cultures.[11]
Extending Morrison’s argument beyond literature to popular
film and public discourse, Aimee Rowe explains what the
deployment of Africanism means for the craft of narrative
construction. White characters, she says, evolve “against a
variably mute and frightening blackness,” while “black
characters, dark things, primitive impulses… sometimes
benevolent, other times exotic, erotic, and terrifying – provide
the necessary backdrop for white characters to struggle in
their complexity and to grow….”[12]
Having recognized the Africanist presence in American
literature, and having complained about criticism that ignores
this presence in canonical writers like Poe, Henry James, and
Hemingway, Morrison calls for alternative forms of criticism.
She calls for, among other things, critics who will “explicate
the ways in which specific themes, fears, forms of
consciousness, and class relationships are embedded in
the...Africanist idiom,” and for “studies that analyze the
strategic use of black characters to define the goals and
enhance the qualities of white characters.”[13] In one answer
to this call, Rowe finds that tropes like counter-whiteness and
multiculturalism shape the depiction of interracial love on film,
and she suggests that they routinely frame the deployment of
Africanism in contemporary film. The narrative of moral
gentrification invites us to extend the Africanist analysis to the
history feature, and affirms Rowe’s reading of blackness in
contemporary film.
3. Saving Whiteness and Claiming Diversity
“Counter-whiteness” is the name that Robin Weigman gives to
the aspiration to an alternative, post-supremacist conception
of white identity. In speaking of “white identity” here, as well
as of “whiteness” and “white supremacy,” as I will soon, I
mean to signify subject positions and institutional structures as
well as the ideological stances and habitual modes of
perception and conception that those positions and structures
routinely call forth. These terms name aspects of historical
processes in which individual white people have played various
roles. To use these terms is not to say that all white people are
racist. It is simply to gesture at the manifest historical fact
that Western civilization has been built upon, among many
other things, the systematic and, for most of its history,
explicitly racialized exploitation and oppression of non-white
peoples by whites. Many whites have fought against white
supremacy, and those who have benefitted from it have done
so unevenly, thanks to the intersection of race with ethnicity,
class, gender, sexual identity, and other axes of social
differentiation. But the overall pattern of benefit is fairly
uncontroversial, as is the fact that this pattern still shapes
contemporary distributions of social goods, both with and
without the assistance of explicit racism.
The need to exchange old forms of whiteness for newer ones
emerges with the decline of classical racialism, the end of de
jure white supremacy, and the emergence of a post-racist
sense of public ethics and etiquette. As Weigman puts it vis-à-
vis the US context,
Integration, no matter how failed in its utopian
projections of a nation beyond race division,
nonetheless powerfully suspended the
acceptability of the public display of white
supremacy, so much so that the hegemonic
formation of white identity today must be
understood as taking shape in the rhetorical, if
not always political, register of disaffiliation from
white supremacist practices and discourses.[14]
As Linda Alcoff points out, disaffiliation is important: white
people after white supremacy do need some morally
acceptable way of understanding their relationship to the
unavoidably racist histories of their communities and
states.[15] Simply disavowing whiteness altogether seems
promising to some but obscures the continuing relations of
power, perception, and privilege that the vocabulary of
whiteness renders perspicuous. Alcoff suggests that the best
way to withdraw allegiance from white supremacy without
denying its persistence and effects is to posit a kind of white
double-consciousness. This “second sight” would recognize the
reality and persistence of white privilege while also celebrating
the history of traitors to white supremacy, like William Lloyd
Garrison and freedom rider Jim Peck. Despite the promise of
white double-consciousness, though, and as Rowe, Weigman,
and Alcoff all point out, the more common forms of
disaffiliation are evasive: they simply sidestep history and
politics altogether.
If disaffiliation is central to the pursuit of counter-whiteness,
then evasive disaffiliation is central to what we might call
“multicultural counter-whiteness.” In the sense of the term I
have in mind, multiculturalism is an ideology that recognizes
the cleavages in multi-ethnic societies with sedimented forms
of socio-economic stratification, but understands these
cleavages principally in terms of liberal ideas about cultural
diversity. This approach has at least three important
consequences. It suggests that inequality emerges from
nothing more than disparities in the luck, effort, and
endowments of distinct individuals and cultures. It displaces
racial conflict and tension onto what Rowe calls “the realm of
interpersonal contact,” where one seeks not social justice but
“individualistic forms of racial healing.”[16] And it replaces the
categories of social-theoretic investigation – oppression,
exploitation, hegemony, and so on – with the thematics of
therapeutic engagement – empathy, friendship, redemption,
and the like.
Hollywood film narratives yoke Africanist tropes to
multicultural counter-whiteness in several familiar ways. In
each case, the quest for counter-whiteness rules out openly
racist depictions of blacks. But traditionally Africanist themes,
relying on Western racialist and racist mythologies, continue to
pervade the fiction-worlds in question. And the traditional
Africanist positioning of the characters, with the blacks
peripheral to and supporting the whites in their character
development, largely remains in place. A few examples may be
useful.
Perhaps the most familiar and least interesting cases are the
films – crime procedurals or police thrillers, most often, like
“Dirty Harry” or “Colors” – in which individual blacks surface
only occasionally, and then as representatives of a generalized
social threat or pathology. Here blacks collectively provide a
backdrop against which the white characters develop and
demonstrate their heroism. Equally familiar but more
interesting are the films like “Monster’s Ball” and, in its way,
the far superior “Far From Heaven” that promise redemption
through miscegenation. In these films, interracial love with
more sensuous, emotional, or noble blacks offers white heroes
deliverance from emotional paralysis and from the legacy of
white supremacy.[17] Somewhat less familiar but perhaps
even more interesting are the films that, like “Ghost” and
“Casablanca,” feature what Robert Gooding-Williams calls
“black cupids.” These films evade racist depictions of lascivious
blacks but recode the trope of black sensuality to make blacks
the vehicles for awakening white characters to their
desires.[18]
There are also the interracial male buddy films, like “48 Hours”
and “Men in Black,” which do the work of racial ideology on (at
least) two levels. First, in the manner of literary narratives like
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, which Leslie Fiedler calls
“the sacred marriage of males,” the nurturing black buddy
enables the white lead to evade adult heteronormative
sexuality, and his friendship absolves the white character of
the crimes of anti-black racial injustice. Then, in a post-civil
rights update of Fiedler’s tradition, there is a kind of quid pro
quo exchange: the white buddy confers his refinement,
professionalism, skill, or institutional legitimacy on the black
buddy in an allegorical resolution of the stereotyped threat
that black male “savages” pose to “civilized” society.
Meanwhile, the black buddy confers his greater sensuality,
style, and spontaneity on his white friend, thereby
reacquainting the white character with his feelings and,
sometimes, with his woman.[19]
A final kind of narrative employs what we might call the “dark
mentor” trope in which central white characters accept
instruction from marginal non-white characters. This education
is both a symbolic penance for the sins of white supremacy as
well as a way out of the psychocultural “iron cage” of white
reserve and repression via a “transtextual” infusion of cultural
style.[20] Quentin Tarantino relies on this trope, from Tim
Roth’s education in “Reservoir Dogs” to Ving Rhames’ lecture
to Bruce Willis in “Pulp Fiction.”[21] (The Kill Bill films provide
an especially interesting case, as the Orientalist set piece –
the apprenticeship with Gordon Liu’s Pei Mei that Uma
Thurman and others undergo – is mediated by the black racial
coding of Kung Fu films in the U.S.)
There are many more narrative themes to explore in this spirit
and much more worth saying about the few that I’ve
mentioned. There is rather a lot to say, for example, about
exceptions, real and apparent, to the broad principles I’ve
described here about the way these themes play out in films
involving indigenous peoples and others, and about the degree
to which the need to recuperate whiteness is really a need to
recuperate white masculinity. But I’ve introduced these themes
here only to situate my claims about the narrative of moral
gentrification in a broader ideological context.
The broader context I have in mind is defined by two facts:
first, that contemporary fiction features continue to recuperate
Africanist themes and techniques; and second, that they do so
to advance a counter-white, post-racist racial project. The
white protagonist remains central in these films, just as in
Huck Finn the protagonist’s goals and growth provide the
framework within which the story unfolds. But the imperative
of counter-whiteness requires that these goals involve finding
a morally respectable place for white people in a post-civil
rights, post-colonial world. The black characters, meanwhile,
remain in the background where they serve as a resource for
the development of the whites. Blacks can serve as resources
in this way because they enter their fiction worlds endowed
with the typical traits of blacks in Western racial mythology.
Sometimes they are an undifferentiated mass, devoid of
culture, history, and individuality: in this form, they are the
threat or the problem against which white heroism defines
itself. At other times, when black characters emerge as distinct
individuals, they are sensual, emotional, physical, indifferent to
convention and decorum, and cool. In both cases, they are,
above all, uncomplicated, requiring little in the way of
character development. (Does Reggie Hammond grow in “48
Hours”? In what was once Hollywood’s most telling way of
answering questions like this, he doesn’t get the girl. He gets a
girl, but she appears nearly at random, unlike Nick Nolte’s love
interest, played by Annette O’Toole, whose ambivalence about
Nolte’s character sets one of the narrative’s goals: Nolte must
become worthy of her. )
4. Gentrification: Spatial and Moral
The aim so far has been to advance two suggestions. The first
is that the aspiration to counter-whiteness and the embrace of
multiculturalism are the preoccupations that shape many
contemporary deployments of Africanism on film. The second
is that the convergence of these post-racist preoccupations
with Africanist techniques yields certain specific outcomes. We
might summarize these outcomes with a series of oppositions:
where white characters are round, blacks are flat (with their
specific mode of flatness fixed by racial mythologies); where
white experiences and actions are normative and central, black
experiences and actions are deviant, pathological, and
marginal.[22] The burden now is to ask how the post-racist
preoccupations and their attendant outcomes shape history
films. My sense, so far registered only in the vocabulary I have
suggested, is that one way to fix ideas in response to this
question is to consider certain dynamics of the post-industrial
city.
Sociologist Ruth Glass first used the term “gentrification” in
1964 to name the process that transforms poor, low-status
urban neighborhoods with distressed housing stock into middle
and upper class neighborhoods with revitalized housing stock.
This process usually displaces the low-status residents, often
disrupting viable and long-standing communities; and it often
does this at the behest and with the encouragement of political
elites, who hope to solve the problems of the post-industrial
city by encouraging contemporary “homesteaders.” In the U.S.
in particular, which will be my focus from this point on, this
process is racially charged: the poor neighborhoods in question
tend to be filled with black and brown people and the middle
class adventurers tend to be white. (Sexual identity plays a
role here as well, though in ways we haven’t space to
consider. Suffice it to say that in the early literature on
gentrification, at least, the pioneers seemed to be middle class
people who were marginal on grounds apart from class, like
gays and lesbians.)[23]
More to the point, gentrification is a racially charged subject
because plausible and familiar stories about the post-industrial
city (stories that it is not the burden of this paper to defend)
hold that our familiar urban problems, and our familiar
conceptions of how to solve them, result in part from racial
asymmetries and biases in public policy. To take just four
examples: many areas of concentrated poverty in U.S. cities
emerged in the wake of urban “renewal” projects that
decimated viable black and brown neighborhoods.
Homeownership in these areas, and among black and brown
people generally, is less common than among whites, thanks
in part to explicit racial biases in the policies that the federal
government used to cultivate the U.S. middle class beginning
in the early twentieth century. The values of the homes in
these areas and the ability of the residents to access capital to
maintain and improve their homes have long been negatively
impacted by redlining and other discriminatory practices in the
real estate and lending industries. And conscious and
unconscious prejudices combine with sedimented barriers to
mobility to lock residents of these neighborhoods out of
employment networks and other pathways to success.[24]
Having moved quite swiftly over several contentious issues, I
want to be clear about what I am not saying. First, I do not
mean to suggest that the problems of the post-industrial city
result from racism and nothing more. Racism, more properly,
white supremacy, is one part of the complex swirl of
economic, cultural, and social forces that makes issues like
immigration, AIDS, and poverty so difficult to address. It is,
however, a real factor and one that has had a discernible
impact.
If something like the foregoing account of gentrification is
correct, then it closely tracks the line of thought developed
above in connection with the uses of Africanism. Urban policy
has, at crucial moments, been either driven or hobbled by flat
images of pathological, cultureless, inherently problematic
black people. Where people like these are concerned, it can
hardly matter that new highways or sport facilities or
downtown revitalization programs will decimate standing
neighborhoods: the residents of these neighborhoods are an
undifferentiated mass with no social ties, no networks worth
preserving. It can hardly matter that concentrated poverty and
widespread gun violence have complex causes: the real cause
is the pathological cluelessness of a problem people. And it
can hardly matter that these problem people have been and
remain at the margins of the processes of democratic
deliberation and of wealth acquisition: because they are
supposed to be marginal, we won’t even notice. What does
matter is that the inner cities get revitalized, as it happens, by
young white people on a redemptive errand into the urban
jungles.
What the idea of gentrification adds to the earlier discussion of
the post-racist uses of Africanism is an explicit engagement
with the historical terrain of white supremacy and an overt
movement to replace problem people with people of promise.
One of the favored solutions for urban problems now involves
shipping out the problem people and inviting in more
promising types, mostly white people whose stores of
financial, human, and social capital have, in broad terms, been
enhanced by social practices and state policies that have
historically been racist in intent, effect, or both (redlining,
whites-only government mortgage programs, and so on).
These promising people, we hope, will take over blighted
spaces and turn them into thriving communities largely by the
magic of their example and initiative and the infusion of their
resources. Never mind that the blight, the magic, and the
resources are, in many ways, different aspects of the same
sociogenic processes, and that separating them delimits the
policy space by ruling out approaches that eschew magic in
favor of, say, thoroughgoing economic restructuring, while also
doing violence to the historical record.[25]
Similarly, in narratives of moral gentrification, the problems of
modern racial history appear in these films as real problems
for people of all colors. But the narratives suppress the evident
historical connections between these problems and the
practices of white supremacy. Instead, they import innocent
whites, whose presence magically solves the problems, at
least insofar as the problems exist for non-problematic people.
The problem people recede into the background as befits an
undifferentiated mass. The souls, the fortunes, and the fates
of white folks come to define terrain that once belonged to
other people, and the terrain itself is cleansed not just of its
former inhabitants but also of its history. Some examples will
help to clarify these ideas.
5. How Mississippi Burning During a Dry White Season
Made the Last King of Scotland Cry “Freedom” (on His
Way Out of Africa)
5a. There are many examples of the moral gentrification
narrative. I’ll start with just two. In “Mississippi Burning”[26]
two white FBI agents somehow become the heroes of the U.S.
civil rights struggle, despite the historical fact that the Federal
Government was notoriously unhelpful for most of the
movement, especially in the domain that the film works
hardest to vindicate as an occasion of white heroism in
protecting ordinary black folks from the systemic, terroristic,
deadly violence of southern white supremacists. It is a
Hollywood film, so there is shooting and blood, and there are
explosions and fires. And while the white heroes routinely
throw themselves into the fray to save the helpless blacks in
their charge, the black characters, such as they are, recede
into the background, and become part of the backdrop against
which the heroic whites work out the nation’s moral problems
and complex fates.
A second example focuses not on the U.S. freedom struggle
but on its South African counterpart. “Cry Freedom”[27] is the
story of white journalist Donald Woods’ experience of and
awakening to the evils of apartheid. The great activist Steven
Biko appears in the film and plays a prominent role. But his life
and death matter on the screen principally as elements in
Woods’ life and radicalization. The film ends not with Biko’s
brutal killing but with Woods and his family escaping South
Africa on a plane. Here the black backdrop to white growth is
a man, not the masses (or not just the masses), but he is a
backdrop all the same.
There is much more to say about these films, as there would
be about any film that had received only a paragraph’s worth
of commentary. There are, for example, questions like these,
questions that go to the heart of my argument here: What,
one might wonder, is the big deal? Of course these films focus
on white people. They were made by white people for white
people. The problem has to do with the political economy of
the moving picture industry in and around the U.S. and with
the fact that non-whites still have uneven access to the means
of cultural production. (Or, more harshly, the problem has to
do with the failure of blacks and other non-whites to make and
patronize films that favorably depict and prominently feature
people who look like them.)
These are reasonable questions, and they help me to be clear
about my point here. Donald Woods has every right to tell his
story, especially since it is a genuinely compelling story that
seems not to invent history ”falsely,” unlike “Mississippi
Burning.” And the makers of “Mississippi Burning” are no more
bound to respect history than the people behind Demi Moore’s
bodice-ripping version of “The Scarlet Letter”[28] are required
to respect their literary source. My concern is that these films
rely on and reinforce patterns of meaning and habits of
perception and interpretation that play important and
destructive roles in life outside the theatre. It is a problem
when people think, and cultivate the habit of thinking, that
only the experiences of white people count and that the
marginalization of non-whites is acceptable and routine. It is a
problem when we ignore, and cultivate the habit of ignoring,
the historical roles of the real people, of every color who
fought for civil rights, and when we replace those real people
with (falsely) invented, historically innocent, wish-fulfillment
mechanisms. In the face of these problems, appealing to the
racially skewed political economy of the film industry doesn’t
help: the industry routinely advances or presupposes ill-
conceived, misleading, and tendentious arguments about the
history and ethics of what we once called race relations. These
arguments can pass unnoticed and the asymmetric relations to
the means of production can seem harmless unless we prevent
these false inventions from masquerading as common sense or
harmless cinematic “license.” That is, these films may be by
white people but that’s part of the problem; and they are not
really just for white people, are never presented as such, and
cannot justifiably function in that way if film industry resources
are unjustly distributed.
Put differently and more concisely, I’m happy that Donald
Woods gets to tell his story. But where is Biko’s Hollywood
film? “Mississippi Burning” is an interesting fantasy. But if we
have to have white heroes, to give white people a moral
foothold in an immoral racial-national history, where are the
mainstream features about the real white heroes, such as the
abolitionists and the freedom riders like Joe Slovo or, if we
need controversy and bloodshed, John Brown? There is
something at work behind the films that get made, some
determination to reclaim and reshape history in the name of
white innocence, much the way contemporary urban
“homesteaders” reclaim urban spaces. This determination is
what I am trying to examine.
At this point, some more questions recommend themselves:
Can’t we defend some of these films as true inventions? Given
the epistemic limits of the mostly white audiences at which
they are aimed, they manage to smuggle in a fair amount of
real history, and they might prepare the way for a deeper
engagement with the past, perhaps without the mediation of a
white protagonist. That is, don’t these films focus on white
characters as a kind of epistemic “sweetener,” to facilitate the
reception of true historical inventions that take up difficult
topics? These are reasonable questions, and I mean to engage
them by considering a film that seems to enact the sensibility
behind them.
5b. “The Last King of Scotland”[29] has the form of a film that
uses an anti-racist epistemic “sweetener.” The film puts a
white character at the center of a story that seems to be about
a black character but does this on the way to exposing some
of the tragic consequences of white supremacy. In light of this
narrative structure, one might interpret the film as a slow-
burning criticism of white supremacy, one that starts slowly
and subtly so as not to lose its overwhelmingly white
audience, but that gathers steam and conviction as its real
protagonist’s mistakes come to mirror the mistakes of
Eurocentric geopolitics. This is an attractive reading, and
probably close to the one the filmmakers meant to motivate.
Unfortunately, the film is more complex, and more
problematic, than this.
The film’s title refers to former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin,
who once joked that he was the last king of Scotland. This
joke revives a political designation that ceased to be
meaningful in the eighteenth century, when the Stuart
“pretenders” to the unified thrones of Scotland and England
were defeated and when Scotland, Wales, and England were
combined to form Great Britain. Reviving this designation
serves several serious purposes for Amin. First, it recalls the
contentious and brutal history of European politics, thereby
undermining any attempt to draw a bright line between the
civilized and stable West and the barbarous and unstable Rest
(of the world). The claim also links Amin and Uganda to
specific moments in that brutal history, thereby identifying
twentieth century Uganda as in part an artifact of, component
of, and participant in British politics. More to the point,
rhetorically claiming the Scottish throne links Amin to the
underside of British history, to the rebellious Scots who sought
to throw off English domination, thereby giving Amin’s
assertions of post- and anti-colonial sovereignty a European
pedigree.
By taking Amin’s claim to the Scottish throne as its title, the
film imports the historico-political rhetoric of the claim,
thereby beginning to substantiate its anti-colonial credentials.
It also, however, establishes the ambiguous doubling that
moves Amin to the periphery of the narrative and brings the
white character to the center. The spectator of the film sees
Amin over the shoulder of a fictional character named Nicholas
Garrigan, a Scottish doctor who manages to become Amin’s
personal physician and principal advisor. As the chief advisor
to the dictator, and as the only semi-rational person we see in
the leadership of Amin’s Uganda, Garrigan is in a way the
power, or the brain, behind Amin’s absolutist throne. In this
sense, he, not Amin, is Scotland’s last king, the last Scotsman
to wield kingly authority.
So far we have the resources for treating Garrigan as an
epistemic sweetener. Manohla Dargis acknowledges as much
in her New York Times review of the film. The doctor, she says,
is an “empathic point of entry,” a starting point from which the
spectator can watch as the film “creates a portrait of this
famous Ugandan dictator from inside the palace walls.”[30] If
this is right, then the film concedes but revalues and disarms
some of the concerns of anti-Africanist criticism. The white
protagonist will be central, but this is intentional and strategic
and designed to create the conditions under which, as it might
be, empathy can spread from the white hero to the black
people whose misfortunes he allows the spectator to witness.
In other words, Amin’s doctor serves this film as a kind of
Forrest Gump for a moment in the history of British
colonialism. Like the title character in “Forrest Gump,”[31]
Garrigan is a vehicle for contemplating the transformations in
a particular social formation over a definite period of time. And
Garrigan’s emotional investment and active involvement in the
Amin regime mirrors the West’s ill-advised investments in and
support for people like Amin (and Pinochet, and so on).
Garrigan is, in Dargis’s words, “a stand-in for all the white
men who have unwisely and cravenly journeyed into the
proverbial heart of darkness.” He is the allegorical centerpiece
of “a very contemporary, pointedly resonant film about
blowback” from the colonial enterprise, which created the
conditions for Amin’s murderous reign.
If all this is right, then “Last King” represents the emergence
of an historically sensitive form of counter-whiteness on film
rather than a myopically post-racist deployment of Africanism.
The white hero doesn’t evade history but immerses himself
and the spectator in it. And along the way he acquaints the
spectator with the human victims of colonialism,
neocolonialism, and the blowback from both.
5c. Unfortunately, the epistemic sweetener reading of “The
Last King” strikes me as utterly implausible. The black
characters are not complex enough to sustain it or to ward off
the worry about Africanism. And the white hero’s immersion in
history is too mediated by racist stereotypes and too
completely governed by realist conventions to animate an
effective anti-colonial allegory.
Dargis anticipates the line of thinking I’ll pursue here in the
title of her review. As she sees it, Amin’s right-hand
(Scots)man is “An Innocent Abroad – Seduced By a Madman.”
First, about the innocent abroad: The white hero’s Gump-like
journey through Amin’s Uganda, which is to say through the
legacy of Great Britain’s Uganda, is driven by bad choices,
hubris, and various less than noble motivations. But he is,
essentially, innocent: great forces beyond his reckoning have
made Uganda what it is. The film, to its credit, does some
work to properly locate some of these forces at the level of
Western geopolitics. But it renders this as a realm of shady
backroom deals beyond the reach or understanding of the
ordinary individuals, like Garrigan, who find themselves
buffeted by the winds of empire. More importantly, the causal
forces most in evidence in the film derive from the
preternatural malevolence of a madman, also beyond the
understanding of ordinary people. If this is the historiophotic
approach the film recommends, it effectively rejects the kind
of reorientation to history that we find in Alcoff’s white double-
consciousness, and instead enacts the same kind of evasive
disaffiliation that we find in “Monster’s Ball” and “Mississippi
Burning.” (Amin’s madness will be of some import in a
moment, after a few more words on the theme of Garrigan’s
innocence.)
While in one sense the Scotsman is too innocent to contribute
to the work of true historical invention, he is in another sense
not innocent enough. He is too richly developed a character to
claim the kind of innocence that reveals the workings of
history instead of obscuring them. In trying to motivate the
“epistemic sweetener” reading of Garrigan’s centrality to the
narrative, I compared him to Forrest Gump. But Forrest Gump
was a cipher, a character ostentatiously constructed to lack
the kind of inner life that would compete with the events
around him for the spectator’s interest. The character of
Garrigan, by contrast, is governed by realist conventions: he
seems a rather ordinary person, whose impulses and choices
we’re meant to credit and evaluate as causal factors in what
happens to him. We focus (I found myself focusing) on
Garrigan himself, on his bad and often inexplicable choices,
which is to say that I was not encouraged to take him as a
stand-in for anyone or anything. The spotlight that the
Scotsman’s journey might have shone on the sociopolitical
conditions in postcolonial Uganda instead remains resolutely on
him, a not-too-bright, improbably lucky (and unlucky)
individual. And this narrowing of focus from postcolonial
allegory to individual picaresque effectively dramatizes the
central motif of multicultural counter-whiteness, collapsing
politics and history into individual luck, private choices, and
interpersonal relations.
If the African characters around Garrigan were more fully
realized, the slip from allegory to picaresque journey might be
less striking and might tell us less about the persistence of
Africanist tropes than about simple missteps in the craft of
filmmaking. But the film clearly revels in the idea of an
innocent Garrigan being “seduced by a madman.” The viewer
of this film is meant to accept (or the film declines to imagine
that anyone would refuse to accept) that Amin was psychotic
or, as the Times review goes on to say, a “flamboyantly lethal
nut job.” But Amin reached the highest ranks of the British
Empire’s African military. He built and maintained political
alliances before and after he took control of Uganda, and he
ran a country for almost a decade. If we take seriously any
reasonable account of political power, especially after the work
of Hannah Arendt,[32] then Amin could not have been simply
“a nut job.” More likely, as political theorist Mahmood Mamdani
has shown, he was “a rational actor – a fascist, rather than a
buffoon or a gorilla.”[33]
The inability to credit Amin’s rationality is an instance of a
broader problem, one that leads us also to think of Hitler as a
monster rather than as a political actor in the grip of particular
ideologies and armed with particular techniques for political
domination. Discussing our reasons for extruding Hitler from
the ranks of humanity would exceed the scope of this essay,
but North Atlantic culture’s imperviousness to the banal
humanity of evil is easy enough to explain when the evildoers
are black and African. With figures like Amin, the trope of
savagery comes in and, as Fanon says in a related context,
reason walks out.[34] So instead of constructing a complex
portrait of Amin the fascist, of a brutal political actor driven by
specific personal and political motives (some of which, yes,
may have warranted some psychological intervention), the film
reproduces the same irrational, inscrutable, black tyrant that
Paul Robeson played in “The Emperor Jones” and that Denzel
Washington played in “Training Day.”[35]
6. Conclusion
As with much else I’ve said here, my reading of “The Last King
of Scotland” is not and could not be dispositive. I have passed
too quickly over the details of the film, of its words and
images, to aspire to an authoritative interpretation. My aim
has been to indicate the contours of a narrative tradition and
to suggest a way of extending it in the direction of recent
historical films about Africans on the continent and in the
diaspora.
The tradition I have in mind is Africanist, in Morrison’s sense,
and uses familiar myths about black people to address white
psychocultural needs. One of the more pressing needs in the
current post-colonial, post-supremacist context is for an ethical
and responsible way for whites to disaffiliate from white
supremacy. This preoccupation has produced narratives of
redemption through miscegenation and of interracial and
homosocial male “marriages,” and it has employed devices like
the black cupid and the dark mentor. I have suggested that
Africanism and the pressures of disaffiliation produce historical
fiction films in which white protagonists “gentrify” historical
terrain that they find morally troubling. These characters take
over and occupy stories that in some sense belong to other
people, in the process displacing the other inhabitants of the
fiction world and obscuring the real relationships between the
whiteness they mean to recuperate and the history they mean
to invade.
I should close with a word about why the sort of thing I’ve
undertaken here is important, if it is. There are some obvious
points to make in this regard, points about the importance of
ideology critique in societies that have replaced domination
with hegemony, or about the importance of cultural literacy –
or “picturacy,” we might say[36] – in a world as image-
saturated and myth-driven as the world that we have made.
These are important things to say, despite their obviousness,
especially when it comes to ideas about human types, like
race and gender. A great deal of modern history has been
driven by dominant ideas about different kinds of people and
about what these different human kinds deserve. And a great
many of those ideas have been hashed out and turned into
“common sense” in the forums of popular culture, from
colonial-era exhibitions and natural history museums to films
like Griffiths’ “Birth of a Nation” and Frank Miller’s “300.” It will
pay us to learn to “read” these ideas, to sensitize ourselves to
the habits they inspire in their less harmful forms, so that we
can be on guard against them when they try to insert
themselves into public policy and public action.
These are important things to say, but many other people
have said them and said them more effectively and eloquently
than I ever could. I want to supplement these thoughts with
some gestures at what it means to take this call for cultural
criticism seriously, and to answer it from the vantage point of
philosophy.
One philosophical response to the call for cultural criticism and
ideology critique connects these practices to aesthetics and to
the sciences of cognition. What I have in mind here is the fact
that ideologies, discourses, and cultural myths do their work
as effectively as they do because the “knowledge” they contain
becomes habitual and reflexive, the subject matter of
immediate, pre-reflective experience. In this form it leads
psychoanalysts to talk about the unconscious and
subconscious, it leads activists of various sorts to talk about
consciousness-raising, it led John Dewey to talk about
aesthetic experience, and it leads cognitive scientists to study
the phenomenon that popular author Malcolm Gladwell calls
“rapid cognition.”[37]
There are two simple ideas behind all of these approaches. The
first is that our ideas, beliefs, capacities, and convictions can
train our powers of perception in ways that enable, or
condemn, us quite literally to perceive quite complicated,
conceptually loaded, phenomena. The second is that this
cognitively funded perception then recruits into its operations
the feelings of pleasure and satisfaction that some thinkers
have associated with the experience of formal beauty. With
the right background and technical training we can see,
immediately and without conscious deliberation, and often
without being able to explain the grounds of our judgment,
whether a hatchling is male or female, or whether a statue is
a genuine antique or an elaborate forgery. Similarly, a certain
cultural training prepares us to see, and to see immediately
and viscerally, that black male bodies are dangerous or that
scantily clad female bodies are flirting or sexually available.
The second, cultural training is much easier to come by than
the first, more technical form, and it is much more likely to
produce erroneous judgments that nevertheless have the feel
of truth.
As it happens, one of the principal training sites for this rapid
cultural cognition is also a promising site for retraining.
Expressive practices like painting, literature, and film can
mobilize, exploit, and reinforce these loaded perceptions. This
is the point behind Dewey’s favorite examples – the
paraphernalia of nationalism, like flags and anthems, and the
objects of ritual observance, all of which work in the general
run of cases by tugging directly at our emotions, without the
intervention of conscious reflection on what these things
mean.[38] But art can also highlight these funded perceptions
for us and help us examine and evaluate them. By stressing
the chain of associations that typically attends racialized bodies
in U.S. visual culture, a work of art can lift these associations
from the domain of common sense and make us interrogate
our perceptions, commitments, and convictions. This is the
idea behind my earlier remark that aesthetic criticism is or
ought to be an essential part of critical race theory.
The idea that aesthetic experience can help retrain our rapid
cultural cognitions points toward a second philosophical
response to the call for cultural criticism and ideology critique.
Here we turn from aesthetics to a kind of perfectionist self-
criticism. The perfectionism I have in mind is a mode of ethical
practice that combines the emphasis on character and habit-
formation that emerges from certain forms of virtue theory
with the emphasis on self-care in relation to dominant or
hegemonic meanings that we find in theorists from Emerson
and Nietzsche to Foucault and Bordo.[39] The burden of this
form of ethical practice is to insist on asking what kind of
person am I becoming? and to take responsibility for the way
the process of becoming manifests the cultural meanings that
flow through and around each of us. This is the ethical core of
the practice of cultural criticism and my principal motivation
for taking otherwise unsatisfying films seriously.
A final philosophic response to the call for cultural criticism
deepens the idea of taking bad films seriously. This response
points toward the literature on art and ethics, and
recommends a version of the clarificationist or cultivationist
approach to narrative and moral education. On this approach,
the ethical value of art lies in two places: its ability to hone
certain ethical skills and powers, like discernment, empathy,
and imagination; and the opportunities it gives us to refine
and exercise our understanding of ethical concepts and
principles by applying and developing the ethical concepts we
already possess.[40]
Films like “The Last King of Scotland” interest me principally as
test cases for a kind of therapeutic clarificationism. This is not
the therapeutic engagement mentioned much earlier, which
refuses political categories and analysis in favor of
psychological remedies and introspection. This is a
perfectionist project in the spirit mentioned above, one that
insists on the important role that expressive practices can play
in the genealogical phases of cultural criticism. Where
clarificationism depicts expressive objects as resources for
clarifying our standing ethical commitments, specifically
therapeutic clarificationism focuses on ethically problematic
works, and insists that the work of clarification can go beyond
the concepts and skills we already possess. Bad or flawed films
can encourage us to identify and root out the bad habits, the
damaging principles and misguided concepts, that our
imperfect cultures have cultivated in us. Films like these can
give us the experience not just of applying the ethical skills we
wish to develop and principles we wish to understand. They
can also provide occasions for the habitual, reflexive
application of unethical skills and principles, and for the
psycho-existential dissonance that attends the second order
criticism of one’s first-order responses. These films invite us to
marginalize or fear members of some groups but not other or
to dismiss one character’s testimony while accepting others.
They give us the cultural cues to trigger these responses: the
marginal or frightening character has a certain accent or
brown skin; the unreliable one is female, and feminine, or has
blonde hair. But they do all this in a post-supremacist culture
that explicitly and routinely encourages us, however unevenly
and superficially, not to treat people in just these ways. And
here, at the jarring intersection of our responses and our
convictions, at the tense juxtaposition of aesthesis, moral
judgment, and cognitively loaded perception, the work of
ethical perfectionism can begin.
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